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Abstract
A key figure which can be applied to measuring inter-generational imbalances involved in
existing public pension schemes is given by the “implicit tax” that is levied on each
generation’s life-time income through participation in these systems. The implicit tax arises
from the fact that, quite generally, pension benefits received fall short of actuarial returns to
contributions (i.e., “explicit” social security taxes) paid while actively working. If, in spite of
large-scale demographic ageing, public pension schemes are continued to be run based on
current rules, implicit tax rates will sharply increase for generations who are currently young
when compared to those who are already approaching retirement. In the paper, this will be
illustrated for the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK, and the US. The
results are based on simulations covering representative individuals in all age cohorts born
from 1940 to 2000. At the same time, there are striking differences across countries regarding
both the level of implicit taxes and their time paths over successive age cohorts, which can be
attributed to different ageing processes as well as to different institutional features of national
pension systems. In addition, we are studying the impact of pension reforms that were
recently enacted or are currently under way, thus demonstrating how effective the measures
taken are in terms of smoothing the inter-generational profile of implicit tax rates.
JEL Classification: H55, J11, D63.
Keywords: demographic ageing, public pensions, pension reform, inter-generational
redistribution, international comparisons.
Robert Fenge












The main goal pursued in this paper is to measure the impact of ageing on a number of
existing public pension schemes. In doing so, we will try to highlight the consequences
of several reform strategies pursued in different countries and the general role of insti-
tutional features for the way ageing affects public pensions. As a concept of measure-
ment, we will refer to the notion of an “implicit tax” that is next to inevitably involved
in any unfunded pension scheme (Fenge and Werding 2003). The set of countries we
have chosen for our exercise focuses on a number of Western European economies −
viz., Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom − as well as the United
States and Japan. In all these countries, public pensions are financed on a pay-as-you-go
basis, either openly or implicitly.
1
Our study follows up on earlier efforts like those undertaken by van den Noord and
Herd (1993), Roseveare et al. (1996), Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999), or Holzmann et al.
(2000). All of these papers suggest alternative approaches to measuring the impact of
ageing on public pensions − in terms of future trends in “net pension liabilities”, deficits
in “general government fiscal balances”, or differences in “generational accounts” − and
apply them to different sub-sets of OECD countries given their current stance of pen-
sion policies. Here, we take into account further steps to reform that were enacted more
recently or are currently under consideration, affecting the long-term perspectives for
financing public pensions. Also, we employ a different concept of measurement, look-
ing at the fiscal consequences of demographic ageing in a simple, but very illustrative,
way from the perspective of individual members of the insured population. More spe-
cifically, we will estimate the financial burden imposed on representative agents be-
longing to the age cohorts born between 1940 and the year of 2000, including those who
are currently approaching retirement as well as young and future workers, that is.
The pension systems to be considered in the following differ quite a lot in their
actual scope (i) in terms of individuals covered (all citizens at working and pensionable
age, all the labour force, or just employees of the private sector in the main branches of
industry); (ii) in terms of risks that are insured (maximum coverage is for longevity,
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1  Where public pensions are partially funded, funds being mostly invested in domestic government
bonds, pensions are of an “implicit” pay-as-you-go variety. When ageing causes net investment in
these funds to become negative, the fiscal consequences will not be fundamentally different from those
in openly unfunded schemes, even though the timing of effects over successive age cohorts may differ.
Here, these considerations apply to the cases of Japan and, to some extent, the US.2
disability, and survivors); and (iii) in terms of the level of retirement income provided
by public pensions when compared to earlier wages of pensioners or to current wages of
those who are still in employment. Furthermore, old-age provision in different countries
is based on very different attitudes towards compulsion vs. voluntary choices regarding
membership, the level of cover etc. Finally, the differing arrangements bring about very
different results in terms of redistribution vs. fairness, both on an intra- and inter-
generational level. In any case, we concentrate on a pervasive type of “first-pillar”
schemes that are administered by public authorities and provide at least some minimum
level of retirement income for the vast majority of workers in each country. Not supris-
ingly, schemes of this type can be found in next to all industrialised economies.
2 Among
the large number of potential examples, we want to include in our study some diversity
with respect to the institutional features listed above. In addition, we are interested in
demonstrating the effects of diverging strategies for coping with large-scale demo-
graphic ageing.
3
Section 2 describes the methodology adopted for our simulations. Section 3 sums
up the results obtained for the “baseline” or “current policy” scenarios for all the pen-
sion systems considered. In section 4, we look at individual countries, explaining some
basic features of national pension schemes and spelling out in some more detail the con-
sequences of ageing given current pension policies or alternative sets of rules derived
from past policies or on-going reform discussions. Section 5 returns to a comparative
perspective, trying to relate our findings to a number of institutional characteristics of
national pension schemes. Section 6 concludes.
2 Ingredients for our projections
2.1 Demographic ageing: projections
Throughout the industrialised world, large-scale demographic ageing arises from two
common trends. One is a typical swing in fertility rates − from a “baby boom” to a bust
in child births − which took place some time between the late 1940s and the early 1970s
and interfered with a more fundamental, secular trend towards having fewer children.
The other is a long-term increase in life expectancy, implying that the number of indi-
viduals who survive until old age becomes higher and higher in proportion to those at
                                           
2  Within the OECD world, the only major exceptions are given by Australia and New Zealand.
3  Of course, the final sub-set of countries covered here is also influenced by the availability of data that
are needed for our calculations and by potential limitations to applying our basic simulation model to
different countries.3
young and middle age. Up to a point, net immigration can mitigate this shift in the
population structure,
4 but only under extreme assumptions it could be expected to off-
set the trend (United Nations 2000). The strength and timing of demographic change
differs considerably across countries, but the fundamental pattern it creates is the same
everywhere.


































Sources: 1950: OECD (1988); 2000/50: U.S. Bureau of Census–online,
Eurostat (2000), Statistical Office of Japan (2001).
In our simulations, we rely on most recent population projections prepared by offi-
cial sources, taking as given assumptions regarding fertility, mortality, and migration
that are used for “main” or “baseline” population scenarios. Following these projec-
tions, the old-age dependency ratio – defined to be the number of individuals aged 65
and older over individuals aged 15 to 64 – will roughly double in most of the countries
considered here in the period from 2000 to 2050. In some cases, it will then have more
than tripled if compared to the level of the early 1950s, when most existing public pen-
sion schemes were introduced or expanded in the aftermath of World War II. Figure 1
gives an overview of both actual numbers and projected ratios of old-age dependency
for the countries selected for our exercise.
                                           
4  Among our set of countries, this is true for the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, for Germany.4
2.2 Implicit taxes: definition
The conclusion that there is a burden involved in any unfunded pension scheme once
the system is matured is an obvious one. Certainly, no one should claim originality for
defining this burden more precisely to be a tax which is implicitly levied on a given
individual’s life-time income. What may have been overlooked for quite some time,
however, is that this notion of an implicit tax is extremely useful (i) for understanding
the general effects of pay-as-you-go pensions for the inter-generational distribution
(Sinn 1997; 2000; Fenge and Werding 2003),
5 and (ii) for demonstrating the particular
impact of ageing on individuals who belong to different age-cohorts (Thum and Weiz-
säcker 2000; Sinn and Werding 2000).
The implicit tax involved in unfunded pensions is simply given by the difference of
an individual’s life-time contributions paid while working and pension benefits accruing
later on, both discounted to net present values of some period t. Defining implicit taxes
on absolute terms is not very instructive. Instead, one may consider the implicit tax rate
t τ  which relates the amount of implicit taxes paid to life-time income earned by a typi-
cal individual belonging to a given generation. Assuming that the members of “genera-
tion t” (i.e., those who take up work in period or “year” t) retire in period T and die in





















































where  1 − T tK ϑ  are periodic contribution rates (or “explicit” social security tax rates),
1 − T t w K  are wages earned while actively working,  1 − Ω K T p  are pension benefits received
while in retirement, and  1 1 − Ω + K t r  are interest rates used for discounting all nominal
amounts to period t values. If pension benefits fall short of the actuarial value of life-
time contributions,  t τ  will be larger than zero.
Taking into account that in unfunded pension schemes, benefits have to be paid out
of current contributions, such that  ) , , , ( 1 1 T t t T t T T T T N N w p p K K + + Ω − + = ϑ  etc., N measur-
                                           
5  Fenge and Werding (2003) provide a thorough discussion of what the tax implied in unfunded pen-
sions really is, how it can be interpreted, and how it relates to other measures for the fiscal burden in-
volved in pay-as-you-go pension schemes, with or without population ageing, that are suggested in the
literature.5
ing the number of individuals in retirement and employment, respectively, and re-
writing wages and cohort size based on periodic growth rates  1 1 − Ω + K t g  and  T T t n K 2 + Ω − + ,
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The main message of this decomposition is that contribution rates ϑ  drive up the im-
plicit tax rate as long as individuals are subjected to paying them themselves; they re-
duce the implicit tax rate as soon as they increase the budget from which individual
pension benefits are financed. All other determinants of τ  are just the ingredients of the
well-known “Non-Aaron condition” (Aaron 1966) which states that in the regular case
where in each period  r n g + < + + 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( , pay-as-you-go pensions involve a burden
( 0 > τ ) for those who participate over their entire life cycle. In the above formula, am-
biguous signs arise from the fact that, within a multi-period overlapping-generations
structure, wage growth, population growth and interest rates are relevant not only for
the (net present value of the) amount of pension benefits that will be received, but also
determine the amount of contributions to be paid.
The expectation that, as a rule, implicit tax rates are positive is true even for a
steady-state where ϑ  is a constant. This follows from the inter-generational redistribu-
tion involved in unfunded pensions, where “inaugural gains” accrue to those who re-
ceive pensions without having paid contributions (over their full period of labour force
participation), while subsequent generations have to pay the bill (Sinn 2000). Yet, if no
shocks occur the implicit tax rate will be constant over all successive age cohorts. When
demographic ageing enters the picture, the time series for  ∞ K t τ  need no longer be bal-
anced across generations. Instead, it is highly likely to go up following a systematic
trend, mainly depending on how long those politically responsible are trying to keep up
the level of pension benefits by increasing contribution rates. Once a new steady state is
reached, τ  will again become a constant, but on a higher level than before.
The focus of this paper is on real-world examples for the profile of implicit tax
rates across different generations. Thus, what will matter most for our simulations is the
“shock” created by demographic ageing, i.e. the change in the age structure of the in-
sured population that is taking place in any of the countries considered, plus the type of
policy reactions that are chosen and the timing of any pension reform. If, for instance,
authorities respond to large-scale demographic ageing by cutting down the level of pen-
sion benefits they will increase the implicit tax rate for those who are currently old-
aged. If, instead, contribution rates are driven up, the tax rate will rise for younger age-6
cohorts. If both types of strategies are combined, the difference between pensions which
would be actuarially fair and actual retirement benefits must be expected to rise for all
the generations involved in the demographic transition.
2.3 Simulation tool and assumptions
As was already stated, we will be looking at  t τ  for the age cohorts born between 1940
and the year of 2000 for all the countries which we selected. It should be clear that our
work involves a good deal of projections regarding population, labour force participa-
tion, and the legal framework for current pension schemes. At the same time, we can
rely on long time-series of existing data for the past development of earnings, contribu-
tion rates and, where appropriate, current pension benefits.
Our simulations have been run using the CESifo Pension Model which was devel-
oped for the Advisory Board of the German Federal Ministry of Economics (Wissen-
schaftlicher Beirat 1998). The model is based on a simple accounting approach suited to
forecast pension budgets that are operated on a pay-as-you-go basis. Originally, the tool
was modelled on the rules entailed in the German Statutory Pension Scheme. For the
present study, it has been extended to capture all other European pension systems in-
cluded here in their basic form, even if some loss in details turned out to be inevitable.
It should be emphasised from the very beginning that, unlike projections based on
general equilibrium models, our simulations do not take into account in a systematic
fashion individual responses to changes in institutions or economic parameters. The
major justification for our simplified approach is that, when the focus is on international
comparisons, general equilibrium models which entail a substantially higher portion of
economic theory turn out to be next to unmanageable. If many of the assumptions that
are made effectively have to be set to meet endogenous restrictions in each country, it is
hard to see what drives the final results in a comparative perspective. Against this back-
ground, taking most aspects of individual behaviour to be exogenous and using as-
sumptions that are deliberately made comparable across countries offers a much more
flexible framework for the kind of exercise we have in mind.
Regarding the European countries covered here, our simulations are based on the
most recent population projections published by Eurostat (2000). Scenarios for labour
force participation (differentiated by gender and 5-year age groups) and employment (or
unemployment rates) have been adopted from forecasts that were made on a national
level because we did not feel in a position to make assumptions regarding these trends7
that are rather country-specific by ourselves.
6 Basically, our assumptions are those
agreed upon for parallel projects run by the OECD (2001a) and the Economic Policy
Committee of the EU (2001), aiming at comparable projections for the impact of ageing
on public finances in all their member countries.
7 All in all, we did not allow for too
much variation across countries with respect to these economic variables.
For the future development of productivity and wages, we invariably assumed real
annual increases by 1.75 per cent a year. Another important variable for our calculations
is given by the real interest rate which we set to be 4 per cent p. a. for the future in our
simulations.
8 Regarding past and present developments of all relevant variables, we of
course used historical data. Last but not least, we took as given the current legal frame-
work of the public pension systems under scrutiny, in most cases adding earlier regula-
tions or current reform proposals as a variant in order to highlight the effects of different
types of policy changes. Thus, we are primarily attempting to arrive at meaningful
“baseline” or “current policy” projections for existing pension schemes where move-
ments are mainly due to changes in the population structure, plus some alternative
“(pre-)reform” scenarios based on policy choices that directly affect the pension sys-
tem.
9 Appendix A summarises the main sources of information used for our projections.
In the case of the US and Japan, we refrained from doing full-scale projections on
our own. Instead, we took as given official forecasts as to the development of all rele-
vant parameters.
10 However, we have been “translating” assumptions regarding wage
growth and real interest rates into our common set of assumptions where necessary in
order to establish cross-country comparability of the results. In addition, we checked
with some care whether the projected developments of benefit levels, contribution rates
and pension funds – which offer some degrees of freedom for managing public pension
schemes – appear to be feasible over the full projection horizon.
                                           
6  In this regard, we also did not think it sensible to use identical assumptions for all countries. Some
fundamental trends, like increasing female participation, attempts to halt early retirement, or structural
reforms aiming at lower unemployment, may be common across (European) countries. Still, the cur-
rent levels of relevant parameters and the timing of these trends can be rather different.
7  In these projects, the impact of ageing was measured in the tradition of “general government fiscal
balances” as suggested by the OECD (Roseveare et al. 1996). Again, see Fenge and Werding (2003)
for a comparison of measurement concepts.
8  Both these number have been determined based on long-term average rates for the major industrialised
countries. Note that our results are clearly sensitive to the difference of r – g regarding both the level
of implicit tax rates and the increases of τ as ageing progresses. The fundamental trends are un-
changed, however, given a reasonable range of variations.
9  For the ease of presenting our results in a comprehensive manner, we also refrained from reporting on
a large set of sensitivity analyses, although work of this type would be clearly useful if our primary
interest were in forecasting national pension budgets.
10  See Board of Trustees (2000) and Ministry of Health and Welfare (2000).8
As a representative agent in each age cohort, we constructed an individual with a
stylised biography and working-career (see Appendix B for the precise pattern assumed
for the case of Germany) which we did not alter over time, i. e. across generations.
11
Basically, we consider a male (blue or white-collar) worker who enters his active period
of life at age 20 and then earns just the average wage of all workers throughout his ca-
reer. He is fully active until some year in his 50s when he is expected to become dis-
abled with some positive probability.
12 With what is left of his earnings capacity, he
goes on working until age 65. Upon retirement, he is entitled to receive old-age pension
benefits for himself and, where appropriate, for his spouse. When he dies, his widow
will receive survivor benefits for some more years if these are contained in the respec-
tive pension scheme.
13
As a result, the three main types of pension benefits – disability pensions, old-age
pensions, and survivor benefits – are included in our model. Owing to our national ex-
pertise, the standardised individual is based on a number of assumptions which may
appear to be natural by German standards. However, we were very reluctant in adapting
them in the cases of other countries. The chief purpose of our calculations is to compare
the effects of different institutions – over time and across countries – and not the impact
of differences in behaviour.
14 We therefore made a number of adjustments with respect
to disability rates and life-expectancy, the latter being particularly important for our
results (e.g., in the case of Japan). But as a matter of fact we stayed as close as possible
with the original design.
For the sake of briefness, we will not go into too many details of the pension sys-
tems that are considered in the following. Comprehensive descriptions, including broad-
based international comparisons of existing pension systems, can be found in various
sources which are regularly up-dated (again, see Appendix A). Information on current
discussions regarding pension reform which are going on in many countries is included
in many readers which have been published recently for the purposes of both policy-
makers and the research community.
15
                                           
11  Among other things, this implies that some of the effects of changes in early retirement over time are
hidden in our calculations.
12  Basically, this probability is given by the ratio of people at working age receiving disability benefits
over the population aged 53−64.
13  Mortality assumptions are based on conditional life-expectancy for males and females at relevant ages.
For more details, see Thum and Weizsäcker (2000) who did earlier calculations for the case of Ger-
many.
14  Of course, this distinction is not a sharp one: in each country, institutional design and individual be-
haviour must be expected to be somehow inter-related.
15  See, for instance, the books edited by Bosworth and Burtless (1998), Siebert (1998), Gruber and Wise
(1999), Renaud (2000), or Feldstein and Siebert (2002).9
3 The results at a glance
Before looking at individual countries, it may be useful to summarise our main results
in a cross-country perspective. Among other things, this may give a flavour of what our
results based on the time profile of implicit taxes over successive age cohorts look like.
At the same time, it may create a feeling for what is specific in each country, deserving
closer scrutiny. Figure 2 displays the results obtained for all the“current policy” sce-
narios considered.
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Source: CESifo Pension Model.
It is easy to see that, for the (unweighted) average of all countries, there is a clear
upward trend in implicit tax rates imposed on life-time income of individuals born be-
tween 1940 and 2000. For the initial cohorts,  t τ  ranges between around −8 and +8 per
cent, while it increases to the 4 to 24 per cent range as we move to the youngest age
cohorts.
16 The upward trend is most visible in the cases of Germany, France, and Japan.
Due to tighter pension policies pursued throughout or to reforms that were recently en-
acted, increases are less pronounced for the UK, Sweden, and Italy. In the US, the level
of  t τ  is remarkably low over the full projection horizon.
                                           
16  For the European countries taken in isolation, we also find that variation increases over time, viz. from
the 4−9 to the 10−22 per cent range.10
These observations imply that there is also some rank reversal across countries
going on during the simulation period. In Germany, the burden implied in public pen-
sions is the highest at both ends of the period covered, while France moves from a mo-
dal position to the top and Japan catches up from a very modest level of burdens to the
(lower) middle. The UK, having imposed strong checks on public pensions for many
years, defend a position in the middle of the scale, in spite of recent policy changes that
potentially drive up pension expenditure over the long term. Sweden and Italy, both
running pension schemes that were rather generous from the very beginning or were
seemingly over-drawn during the 1970s to 1990s, respectively, successfully restrict the
burden involved in their systems for younger age cohorts. Thus, both countries give
examples of remarkable reforms that have taken place in continental Europe, although
the level of burdens to be controlled and the speed of adjustments may differ.
4 Results for single countries: the impact of policy responses
4.1 Germany
In Germany, the Statutory Pension Scheme (Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung) provides
the dominant form of retirement income, covering more than 75 per cent of the current
labour force. The scheme does not include civil servants. Also, a large fraction of the
self-employed is covered outside the public pension system. Initially, the scheme was
conceived to be the public branch of a conventional multi-pillar system. But so far nei-
ther employer-based pension plans nor private provisions (other than owner-occupied
housing) have ever played a significant role in the overall structure of old-age provision
in Germany.
The Statutory Pension Scheme is a prototypical “social insurance”, being organised
as a separate public budget, financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with ear-marked contri-
butions, and entailing no major elements of redistribution from the rich to the poor.
17
Contributions are linear in the insured workers’ earnings, subject to an upper limit
which is uniform for both employees and employers.
18 Obligations are shared between
these two parties on a 50:50 base. The system is rather ambitious in granting benefits
which currently amount to about 70 per cent of an uprated average of life-time net
                                           
17  It should be mentioned that in Germany old-age poverty is taken care of outside the public pension
system. However, the proportion of elderly people living on social assistance is much lower than their
share in total population.
18  The limit has been next to constant for many years at about 180 per cent of average wages.11
earnings. Pensions are basically indexed to wages, such that their level keeps pace with
the growth rate of net earnings.
The system has expanded in the 1960s and the early 1970s. Since then, the level of
pensions has been roughly kept constant. In order to do so, contribution rates had to be
increased by a considerable margin, due to the slow down in economic activity which
took place during the 1980s and early 1990s and, more prominently, to the increasing
demographic pressure. Based on a defined-(level-of-) benefits policy legally defined in
the “Pension reform act 1992”, the contribution rate cut through the 20 per cent line in
1997 – a level which had always been regarded as some sort of natural ceiling. At that
time, projections indicated that under unfavourable conditions contributions would even
go up to 28 per cent or more by 2035 (i. e., when the peak load of the “baby boomers” is
expected to enter retirement).
19 As a consequence, a long debate arose on how to stabi-
lise the system on a more sustainable footing.
Effectively, it has taken two full-scale attempts at deciding over a new pension re-
form. Backed by a majority in parliament, the pre-1998 government enacted what was
then called the “Pension reform act 1999”. It would have produced a reduction in re-
placement rates by around 10 per cent, also adding more severe checks on early retire-
ment and disability pensions. The law was suspended by the new government elected in
late 1998 because it was said to be too extreme. Later on, the new majority came out
with another reform proposal (“Govt. reform proposal 2000”) which, at least during the
first round of discussions, was expected to be even more restrictive in terms of cutting
down future pension benefits (now by about 15 per cent, though with a different tim-
ing). In subsequent discussions, it became apparent that trade unions were not willing to
support the proposal in its original form. Consisting of social democrats and the (left-
wing) “green” party, the new government was not able to resist these pressures and re-
vised the proposal. The reform that was finally accepted in summer 2001 and became
effective immediately (“Current policy scenario”) is again very close to the 1999 plans,
although the precise mechanism used for reducing the benefit level is different.
In 1998, the old government also started to change the way in which the pension
budget is financed. More specifically, it increased the federal subsidy, financed from
general taxation, beyond the level of non-contributory benefits included in the Statutory
Pension Scheme. The new authorities immediately decided to follow this policy of
making future burdens less visible. In our projections, we therefore corrected contribu-
tion rates for the time path of future subsidies that result from these adjustments in law,
                                           
19 See  Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1998). Werding (1999) as well as Sinn and Thum (2000) provide sur-
veys on existing projections.12
calculating “pure” pay-as-you-go equilibrium rates which would be needed to finance
for total benefits.
20
The 2001 reform differs from all earlier approaches in that the reduction of public
pension benefits shall be made up for by increased pre-cautionary savings. Starting from
2002, individuals are expected to save up to 4 per cent of their gross earnings using a
newly defined set of certified products. Savings are subsided at rates that are contingent
on income and family status (in particular, the number of children), but so far have not
been made mandatory. As in many other cases, it is an open question whether this will
really increase private savings, instead of just re-directing flows that would otherwise
have gone into a larger class of assets. Abstracting from the subsidies, which are hard to
quantify in terms of the representative agent’s net gains (and partly just replace other
forms of savings-related transfers that existed before), these auxiliary savings can be
expected to earn a market rate of interest and, therefore, do not affect our calculations.
The combined effect of all these adjustments in single policy variables can be
measured in a comprehensive way by calculating the “implicit tax rate” falling on indi-
viduals belonging to successive age-cohorts born between 1940 and the year of 2000.
Figure 3 shows our results for the different policy scenarios explained before.
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Pension reform act 1992
Govt. reform proposal 2000 (benefit level –15%)
Current policy scenario (benefit level –10%)
Source: CESifo Pension Model.
                                           
20  Absent the federal subsidy contribution rates have to be higher by about 0.8 percentage points in the
year of 2000, but by around 5 percentage points at the end of our projection horizon.13
For those who were born in 1940 (and entered the labour market after the 1957
pension reform which laid out the overall design of the German pension system for the
post-war period), the implicit tax rate has been around 9 per cent of life-time earnings.
Irrespective of the legal framework which is assumed, this tax rate must be expected to
rise for all subsequent age cohorts. Implicit taxes stay roughly constant at a level of
about 11 per cent for those born between 1950 and 1965 (the “baby boomers”). For in-
dividuals born 1970 and later on, the tax rate will again continue to increase. In any of
the policy scenarios considered, it will more than double for those who are born cur-
rently if compared to the initial value.
If, like in the 1992 legal framework, responses to demographic ageing mainly con-
sist of adjustments in contribution rates, the burden of financing for old-age pensions is
largely passed on to subsequent generations. For instance, it is not the “baby boomers”
themselves who will have to bear the highest tax rate but, roughly speaking, their chil-
dren who are much fewer in numbers. This is a typical result for the way in which pay-
as-you-go schemes with defined benefits distribute the burdens associated with ageing
across generations. In a sense, a policy of increasing contribution rates can be inter-
preted like the introduction of a new pay-as-you-go system on top of the old one: new
“inaugural gains” accrue to those who are already in retirement – here, these gains are
just enough to reduce the rising burden inherited from earlier generations – and younger
age cohorts have to pay the bill (see section 2.2).
Against this background, what different approaches to pension reform can achieve
is essentially the following: the particular timing of how they affect contributions and
benefits carries through to a different timing of implicit tax rates, shifting some of the
burden projected for young and future age-cohorts to older generations. For the implicit
taxes falling on older generations, the reduction in pension benefits is more important,
while the contribution rates they are facing are mostly given from past history. On the
other hand, younger generations benefit from lower contribution rates before they will
be receiving lower old-age pensions. The net effect for younger cohorts must be an ad-
vantage by the mere existence of  t τ . Theoretically, mutual changes in overall burdens
for old and younger individuals should be expected to cancel out (Sinn 2000). This is
not immediate from figure 3 for two important reasons. First, some of the additional
burden created by pension reform is falling on those who were born before 1940, but are
still in retirement. Second, there is an effect of cohort size to be taken into account when
we are looking at individuals, not at full age cohorts. On a per-capita basis, the reduc-
tion in burdens associated with pension reform can be much higher for cohorts who are
relatively small in size than the additional burden placed on larger generations.14
These interpretations clearly fit to our results regarding the two different reform
scenarios considered in figure 3. The government proposal, which did not pass the par-
liamentary process in its original form, would have put higher burdens on current “old”
and “middle-aged” generations than the reform that has finally been taken. At the same
time, it would have reduced the tax rate for future generations based on a deeper cut in
the long-term level of pension benefits. If looked at from outside, however, neither of
the reforms considered in Germany so far has substantially altered the fundamental
trend in implicit tax rates.
4.2 France
The French system of old-age provision is much more fragmented than the system that
is in place in Germany. For about 70 per cent of the labour force, retirement income is
mainly provided by the Régime Général, plus two complementary second-pillar
schemes (ARRCO and AGIRC). Employees working in the public sector or with large
national firms are covered by specific schemes with respect to their second-pillar
claims. As in many other countries, people in self-employment are insured by other spe-
cific schemes. The Régime Général and many of the second-pillar schemes are co-
managed by social partners (i. e., by trade unions and representatives of firms), with
strong control over social affairs awarded to these groups of stake-holders. As a result,
reforming the system has turned out to be very difficult at several attempts during past
years, in spite of growing concern about future sustainability of the current system.
21
Taking together the two pillars of old-age protection for typical employees, the re-
placement rate in France ranges from almost 100 per cent for very low wages to around
60 per cent for high earnings (Charpin 1999). If the public Régime Général is consid-
ered in isolation, average workers receive a cover of around 50 per cent of their wages
earned during the best 10 to 25 years in employment. The range of years which are rele-
vant for accruals has been extended by the latest reform which was enacted in 1993. The
major step to reform taken at that time was to replace prior wage indexation of pensions
after award by CPI indexation. As another important element of reform, the 1993 law
extended the number of years needed in order to qualify for full pension entitlements
from 37.5 to 40 years. Still, what is particular in France is a very low median age at re-
tirement (Blanchet and Pelé 1999), which is not at least due to the fact that the Régime
Général still allows for regular retirement at age 60. While the statutory retirement age
is subject to intense discussions, no further decisions have been taken to increase it.
                                           
21  As an early example, see the Livre blanc by the Commissariat Général du Plan (1991).15
As a consequence of the 1993 reform, the French Régime Général now follows a
mixed strategy with regard to defining the level of current pensions. At award, pension
benefits are calculated to meet the replacement rate of 50 per cent mentioned before.
Subsequently, pension claims are only adjusted in order to keep their purchasing power
constant until the retiree dies. An erosion of the overall level of old-age provision pro-
vided by the general regime is thus avoided. On an individual level, however, retirement
income will fall short of current living standards of workers at an increasing rate as pen-
sioners are growing older.
22
All in all, the authorities have made some steps towards tightening the public pen-
sion system 1993. But so far, they did not lay hands on the level of pensions at award.
As a matter of fact, they did not arrive at enacting any further reforms at all, although
the public debate has continued. Currently, the social partners involved in the process
have postponed discussions until late in the year of 2002. Our calculations for the case
of France (see figure 4) are therefore based on the two types of legal systems that can be
observed from the past.
23
Since the level of pensions provided by, and of contributions made to, the general
regime is basically not excessive, the graphs shown in figure 4 start at relatively low
levels of implicit taxes.
24 For the “current policy scenario”, the tax that is implicitly
placed on those born in 1940 is estimated to be at about 3.65 per cent of life-time in-
come. Based on the earlier law, it even would have been as low as 2.5 per cent. Due to
large changes in the population structure, implicit tax rates are constantly rising for sub-
sequent generations as they are in the case of Germany. If no further checks are placed
on the level of benefits, contribution rates will sharply increase and implicit net taxes
must be expected to approach 16 per cent as their end-of-projection level, taking into
account the effects of the latest pension reform.
Figure 4 also indicates that the changes enacted in 1993 have already been power-
ful in reducing the burden passed on to young and future generations.
25 If the current-
                                           
22  This is true under usual conditions – i.e., if the growth rate of nominal wages exceeds the inflation rate
over the long term.
23  In the case of France, we dropped disability benefits from our calculations because they are financed
from a separate budget (FSI) which is heavily subsidised from the general government budget. Omit-
ting disability pensions on both the revenue and benefit side leaves our results undistorted, although
we may underestimate the full burden involved in the usual package of old-age security benefits as de-
fined at the outset of section 2.2.
24  In 1960, the amount of contributions payable to the Régime Général was 8.5 per cent of current earn-
ings. Today, the contribution rate has reached a current 16.35 per cent.
25  For the representative agent with a standardised work-biography, the most important element of these
reforms is the change in indexation rules. The other elements of tightening the earlier system also
contribute to decreasing the amount of future pension expenditure and, hence, of revenues needed,
whereas full-time employees with a complete work-record will not be affected too much in terms of
receiving lower benefits.16
law scenario is compared to the pre-1993 law projection, a substantial shift in the inter-
generational burden sharing is visible. Since the system which is in place today reduces
current and future contribution rates, all generations who are now middle-aged or
younger clearly benefit from the reform. Again, this result goes through in spite of the
reduction in future real benefits that will accrue to the same individuals once they are in
retirement. Nonetheless, considering the final level of taxes implied in the Régime Gé-
néral, our estimates show that there is significant scope for further reform if the goal is
to balance the system more than has been achieved so far.
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Source: CESifo Pension Model.
4.3 United Kingdom
The U.K. system of old-age provision has gone through many changes during the last 25
years. Basically, the public pension system is a two-tier system providing a flat-rate
benefit, the “State Basic Pension”, and an additional earnings-related component which,
until early 2002, was called the “State Earnings Related Pension Scheme”, SERPS.
(Following the latest reform to which we will return later on it has been redefined as the
“State Second Pension”, or “S2P”). Both types of benefits are based on pay-as-you-go
financing and are administered as a separate public budget, the so-called National Insur-
ance. SERPS has been introduced in 1978, replacing an older system of “Graduated
Retirement Pensions” based on contributions prior to 1975 which is now quickly fading17
out. In the early 1980s, a “contracting out” clause was introduced allowing to opt out of
SERPS for a voluntary membership in other, employer-based or fully private pension
plans. In return, a rebate on National Insurance contribution is granted. The precise rules
governing opportunities to quit the system of publicly provided supplementary pensions
have been redefined several times and are subject to constant debate.
Currently, around one third of the U.K. labour force still participates in SERPS (or
S2P). Almost two thirds are covered by different forms of contracting-out arrange-
ments,
26 while a minority of less than 5 per cent have no cover apart from State Basic
Pensions (Blake 2002). On the other hand, around 44 (64) per cent of retirement income
accruing to married couples (in brackets: singles) is provided by public benefits,
27 30
(22) per cent comes from occupational pensions, and another 16 (9) per cent are income
derived from individual investment (Department of Social Security 2000).
The observation of frequent change is also true for the overall structure of the pub-
lic pension system that remains in operation for those who are still contracted in and, to
a lesser extent, for those who opted out. In 1975, the way in which revenues for Na-
tional Insurance were raised has switched from lump-sum contributions to earnings-
related contributions, with a complicated structure of differing contribution rates ap-
plying to both employees and employers across several wage brackets. Since then, the
structure has changed several times. Currently, there is a uniform lower threshold for
contributions to become payable for employees and employers (£ 87 per week of gross
wages in the fiscal year of 2001/02).
28 Employees have to pay a fraction of 10 per cent
of contributions when contracted in, while employers have to pay 11.9 per cent of con-
tributions.
29 In the case of employees, an upper earnings limit (£ 575 per week) is de-
fined, while for employers no such limit is in place. Current contracted-out rebates are
1.6 and 3 per cent of earnings for employees and employers, respectively. In the fol-
lowing, we will first concentrate on the case of contracted-in employment.
Until early 2002, individuals who had not opted out from SERPS received a flat-
rate benefit (in 2001/02: £ 115.90 a week, including a “spouse benefit” allocated to
                                           
26  The dominant form of contracting out is based on “contracted-out salary-related schemes” which were
introduced from the very beginning. More recently, so-called “money purchase” schemes and “appro-
priate personal pensions” are growing more and more important, but still are much smaller in size than
the salary-related plans (Government Actuary’s Department 2000).
27  This includes a number of non-(old-age pension and incapacity) benefits, like housing benefits, coun-
cil tax benefits, etc.
28  Note that this lower threshold is not fully identical with the “lower earnings limit” (£ 72 a week) de-
fining the minimum amount of income insured.
29  National Insurance contributions are partly used to finance for other than pension benefits (including,
among other things, an allocation to the British National Health Service since a number of years). In
our calculations, effective contributions have been corrected in order to make the results comparable to
those obtained for other countries.18
partners who do not qualify for a State Basic Pension), plus the earnings-related sup-
plementary pension, covering 25 to 20 per cent of an uprated average of life-time wages
falling in the range between lower and upper earnings limits. (The maximum of 25 per
cent has been reached for those retiring in the year of 1999/2000, while for subsequent
cohorts of pensioners, accrual rates were to be gradually reduced, so that a replacement
rate of 20 per cent was scheduled to be fully effective for those retiring after 2015.) As a
result of contributions that are largely linear in earnings between lower and upper limits
and benefits that are composed by a lump-sum amount and an earnings-related compo-
nent, the British public pension scheme must be expected to redistribute across earnings
brackets in a conventional manner, i. e. from those with higher earnings to those who
earn low wages. In order to capture this feature in our calculations, we consider three
main types of workers. Those with “high earnings” are receiving wages that are 50 per
cent higher than those with “average earnings” throughout their working-life. Converse-
ly, those regarded as receiving “low earnings” are on wages that are 50 per cent below
the average. These relations apply to both past and projected wages, and we will see
how this affects the level and time-path of implicit tax rates for the income groups de-
fined here.
30
A very important issue for both the financial prospects of the U.K. pension system
and the level of implicit taxation of current and future generations turns out to be the
following. If earnings limits and flat-rate Basic Pensions are assumed to be indexed to
prices over the next 50 years, as they have been during the 1980s and 1990s, the system
would become less and less expensive on relative terms – if compared to current GDP,
for example. At the same time, the system effectively changes its nature: By 2050, those
with high earnings would pay contributions only for less than one third of their wages,
those with average earnings would pay contributions on half of their wages, while for
those with low earnings, contributions were payable on 90 per cent of their wages.
31 In
                                           
30  In the case of other pension systems considered here – in particular, that of France – redistribution is
effected more indirectly through limits on the number of years that are relevant for calculating indi-
vidual pension claims. In these cases, the direction of redistribution is not as obvious as in the present
case. For instance, those may benefit from these rules who have spent a long time qualifying for high-
skill jobs and are earning rather high wages during a shorter period of time, thus being entitled to re-
ceive high pension benefits. Therefore, we did not see a straightforward method of how to capture
these institutional features for a comprehensive comparison across countries and stayed with the de-
sign based on full-time working-careers for individuals with average earnings.
31  Currently, the upper earnings limit is in the range of 125 per cent of average wages. It has been up to
160 per cent in the early 1980s but, due to increases that fell short of wage growth, it has substantially
eroded since then. Conversely, the lower earnings limit defining the fraction of earnings that is ex-
empted from contributions in  the case of low-wage earners has declined from more than 20 per cent to
about 16 per cent over the last two decades. Continuing with price indexation of earnings limits would
extend these trends into the future. Up to a point, the recent introduction of higher thresholds for con-
tributions to become payable can be seen as a side-step meant to avoid part of these problems.19
the State Basic Pension scheme, all of these individuals would be entitled to receive
pensions that have gone down to about 11 per cent of average earnings, whereas the
current replacement rate is around 25 per cent. The impact in terms of implicit tax rates
imposed on individuals in different age cohorts with differing earnings profiles is shown
in figure 5, panel a).
The main alternative that has been considered by the current Labour government
for several years is given by earnings upratings of both earnings limits and flat-rate
benefits (see Government Actuary’s Department 1999). In this case, the public pension
scheme would expand with old-age dependency and with economic growth. As a con-
sequence, future contribution rates would be much higher than in the price-uprating
scenario. Also, the pension system would retain its character regarding replacement
rates and intra-generational redistribution. It is easy to understand that decisions re-
garding any of these policy options that are binding over the long term are not feasible.
For the fiscal year of 2002/03, however, the government has adopted a mixed indexa-
tion regime that comes close to the case of full earnings upratings: old-age pensions,
survivor benefits (but no other benefits included in the National Insurance scheme like,
e.g., incapacity benefits) and lower earnings thresholds have been increased in line with
wage growth, while the upper earnings limit is still indexed to prices (Government Ac-
tuary’s Department 2002). If we take this as indicating a new type of policy to be pur-
sued until 2050, we obtain the alternative set of results presented in figure 5, panel b).
Another element of the current reform package that is captured in figure 5 b) is the
switch from SERPS to the new S2P regime which is based on the Child Support, Pen-
sions and Social Security Act 2000. Here, the main adjustment is that accruals are no
longer linear in earnings between lower and upper earnings limits. Instead, the range of
covered earnings is divided into three bands, with marginal accrual factors varying from
40 per cent over 10 per cent to 20 per cent as one moves from the lower earnings limit
to higher wages. As a consequence, the S2P benefit formula has also become more re-
distributive across different earnings brackets, thus reinforcing the effect of current
changes related to the State Basic Pensions. Redistribution from high-wage earners to
those with low wages effected through the S2P scheme may still be limited by the fact
that the upper earnings limit might be constantly indexed to prices only.
32
                                           
32  On the other hand, if this particular policy were followed until 2050, the lower earnings limit would
eventually approach the upper earnings limit. We therefore assumed that the upper earnings limit will
effectively be replaced by the new threshold between “bands” 2 and 3 of covered earnings (slightly
more than 100 per cent of average earnings) once this threshold, when indexed to wages, exceeds the
current upper limit.20
Figure 5: Implicit tax rates − U.K. National Insurance (Contracted-in employment)
a) Pre-2002 law (price indexation of earnings limits and flat-rate benefits + SERPS)
b) 2002 reform (wage indexation of earnings limits and flat-rate benefits + S2P)














1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000



























































1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000














































Comparing the two scenarios considered in figures 5 a) and b), we shun any pre-
dictions as to which path of policy will be followed in future upratings of all the rele-
vant parameters. In spite of labelling the panels as the “pre-2002 law” and the current
“2002 reform”, it may be reasonable to assume that actual developments may be located
somewhere between the two limiting cases simulated here, if only because political
majorities responsible for current short-term adjustments may continue to change.
In any case, given the low level of public old-age protection in the U.K., all curves
shown in figure 5 start at relatively low tax rates. For those born in 1940, implicit taxes
are lower in the case of earnings upratings than in the alternative case since, given their
past record of contributions, they will receive higher benefits in the future if this is the
option chosen. This is true across all classes of earnings who are generally ordered, as
should be expected, according to a positive correlation between their level of earnings
and the size of implicit tax rates they are facing.
33 As the system has expanded with the
introduction and maturing of SERPS, tax rates for the age cohorts born between 1940
and 1960 are increasing, the ranking of income groups being unchanged. For younger
age cohorts, their full life-time burden incurred through contracted-in participation in
the National Insurance system of old-age provision will be highly dependent on the
choice of future upratings.
In the case of price upratings of the relevant parameters, tax rates imposed on
young and future generations will go down for those with (higher than) average earn-
ings. The fact that they will have to pay lower contribution rates on decreasing portions
of current earnings will more than compensate these individuals for their lower pension
entitlements. On the other hand, for individuals with low earnings, implicit tax rates
must be expected to increase over time in a process by which they might eventually
converge towards those for individuals with higher earnings. As a matter of fact, the
redistributive features of the U.K. system of public old-age provision would gradually
fade out if the policy of price-oriented indexation of all the relevant parameters were
pursued throughout the long-term horizon of our projections.
34 In the alternative sce-
nario based on earnings-oriented upratings, tax rates will continue to increase as in the
                                           
33  It should not come as a surprise that the implicit tax rate can be next to zero or even negative for “low
wage” earners who benefit from redistribution between the rich and the poor. If we were looking at in-
dividuals with wages in the range of the lower earnings limits, the net subsidy received through the
flat-rate basic pension would turn out to be even higher.
34  It is sometimes argued that the intra-generational redistribution that is built into the British (and, to
some extent, the US) public pension scheme is partly off-set by the fact that individual life-expectan-
cies and, hence, net present values of pension benefits are positively correlated with the level of earn-
ings. At the same time, our main finding is not that there is intra-generational redistribution involved
in the UK pension scheme but that, given it exists, there will be a strong tendency to revert it in the
case of continuous price upratings. In this case, the diverging trends in implicit tax rates for different
earnings brackets would go through even if the claim discussed here is correct.22
other countries considered before. They are lower than in the earlier cases because the
British public pension system is less ambitious than those in other European countries
and because the process of ageing is not as extreme in the U.K. as in most of continental
Europe. Furthermore, in this scenario the redistribution of income involved in the Brit-
ish pension system will remain roughly intact, the burden imposed on high wage earners
being limited through the ceiling on their contributions.
Arguably, none of the scenarios looked at so far should be called the “current pol-
icy scenario”, demonstrating how public pensions affect life-time income of an average
British worker. As a matter of fact, the variant included in our initial survey of major
results (i.e., in figure 2) is the one related to individuals with average earnings who left
the public supplementary pension scheme altogether (under the “reform 2002” frame-
work). Considering that effective life-time tax rates for current workers are largely
positive, in particular for those earning high or average wages, there may be a strong
incentive to opt out of the National Insurance system to the largest possible extent.
Since contracting out is limited to SERPS or S2P, the effect of doing so is not as large
as one may suspect (see figure 6).
Figure 6: Implicit tax rates in the U.K. − Contracted-out employment (2002 reform)
Source: CESifo Pension Model.
In figure 6, we concentrate on the most conventional case of contracting out for
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rates that have been introduced more recently with respect of other forms of contract-
ing-out arrangements. In addition, we assume that future rebates will have to correspond
to the development of S2P claims foregone. This implies that in the case of earnings
upratings, rebate rates will have to be roughly constant over time (while, in the alterna-
tive case of price upratings, they would have to be reduced over the next two decades
because the fraction of income insured in the S2P scheme would considerably decrease;
see Government Actuary’s Department 1999).
All in all, our results for the case of “contracted-out” employment indicate that
evading part of the public pension system creates an advantage for average earners who
are born since the late 1940s. Similar things are true for those with high earnings, while
low-wage earners are always better off staying with public supplementary pensions. At
least, this is a clear-cut result following the most recent adjustments made in 2002.
4.4 Italy
In Italy, the old-age dependency ratio is expected to exceed 61 per cent by 2050 (see
figure 1). Thus, Italy will be hit by demographic ageing more than most other European
country. At the same time, pension spending per GDP in Italy is the highest among a
larger number of OECD countries today, at the outset of these imminent changes. This
is due to a public pension system which has been very generous for several decades in
terms of granting relatively high benefits to employees who retire rather early (Baldini
et al. 2001; Franco 2002). Before any reforms were started, the level of fully-fledged
pension claims accruing to an average Italian worker with a full work-record was about
79 per cent if compared to current wages earned by active individuals. Reductions in the
case of early retirement were virtually absent.
As a consequence, those who are insured in the Fondo Pensione Lavoratori Di-
pendenti (FPLD) – the central pillar of the Italian public pension system − are faced
with extreme contribution rates. In 1995, contributions amounted to 27.12 per cent of
gross wages, shared between employers and employees. On top of that, the system has
received substantial subsidies from general tax revenues until the mid-1990s, contrib-
uting to large public deficits. As a consequence, reforming public pensions was one of
the major tasks to be accomplished when Italy started to go for a more balanced situa-
tion of public finances in the course of preparing for the European Monetary Union.
Recent pension reforms in Italy have been enacted in two steps: the so-called
“Amato reform” introduced in 1992, and a more radical step taken through the “Dini
reform” in 1995.
35 The revisions affect all branches of the Italian public pension
                                           
35  For relevant surveys, see Hamann (1997), Ferraresi and Fornero (2000) or, again, Franco (2002).24
scheme, although our calculations concentrate on the FPLD which covers around 70 per
cent of the Italian labour force.
36 The 1992 reform was primarily aimed at limiting the
share of pension expenditure to its 1992 level (equal to 14.9 per cent of GDP) by means
of a switch from wage indexation to CPI indexation of benefits and an extension of the
reference period for pensionable earnings from no more than five years to virtually the
whole working life. Other measures taken in 1992, like the increase in the statutory re-
tirement age (from 55 to 60 for females and from 60 to 65 for males), were partly rolled
back by the subsequent reform which followed a new approach to strengthening the
principles of actuarial fairness inside public pension schemes.
The new philosophy established in 1995 is that the definition of individual pension
claims should rest on “notional individual accounts”. In the post-1995 system, old-age
pensions are strongly related to contributions paid over the whole working life, based on
an age-related conversion coefficient which uses GDP growth as the internal rate of
return to life-time contributions and implies actuarial reductions of benefits in the case
of early retirement. Given these changes, workers are relatively free in choosing their
retirement age between 57 and 65 years.
Following these reforms, the long-term prospects for financing public pensions in
Italy have clearly improved. Prior to the 1992 reform, the ratio of pension expenditure
over GDP was expected to approach 25 per cent by 2030, while the latest official pro-
jections state that it may be close to 16 per cent in 2030 and could then decline to about
13 per cent until 2050 (Ministero del Tesoro / Ragioneria Generale dello Stato 1999).
Similarly, the contribution rate was formerly expected to exceed 55 per cent at some
point in the mid-term future. It has been set to a current 33 per cent in the aftermath of
the latest reform, but is now expected to stay roughly constant over the next three dec-
ades.
37 Still, pension benefits and the corresponding contribution rates will be rather
high over the next two decades, as is observed by many national experts (Hamann 1997;
Ferraresi and Fornero 2000; or Franco 2002). The main reason is that the phase-in of the
reform is extremely gradual, with transition periods implying that the 1995 reform –
taking into account and extending transition periods related to the 1992 reform package
– will not become fully effective before 2050. In other words, older workers are largely
protected against the extra-burden involved in pension reform, while younger workers
still have to pay for relatively high pensions for quite some time.
                                           
36  In the Italian public pension system, other categorical schemes are operating for farmers and agricul-
tural workers, artisans, shopkeepers, and other groups of mainly self-employed professionals.
37  These predictions are largely confirmed by our own projections. In the case of the pre-1992 legal
framework, contribution rates would climb up to 55.7 per cent in 2040, then declining to slightly less
than 50 per cent until 2050. Based on the 1995 reform, they may now peak at 35.6 per cent during the
late 2020s, then returning to about 26 per cent by 2050.25
How do these trends and observations translate into patterns of implicit tax rates
imposed on individuals born between 1940 and 2000? As in the case of other countries,
we compare three variants of legal arrangements which have been effective in the past
decade: the pre-1992 framework, the 1992 (“Amato”) reform, and a current policy sce-
nario based on the latest 1995 (“Dini”) reform. If compared to the results obtained for
other countries, two aspects are immediate from figure 7. First, the overall level of taxes
implied in the Italian public pension scheme is rather high. This comes as no surprise
taking into account the current high levels of both contribution rates and pension bene-
fits. Second, we observe that it takes quite some time in the Italian case until individuals
are faced with lower life-time tax rates as a result of pension reform.
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Current policy scenario (1995 reform)
Source: CESifo Pension Model.
For the (baseline) case of retirement at age 65, our calculations indicate that indi-
viduals born 1980 and later would have benefited from the 1992 reform. Taking into
account the subsequent changes enacted in 1995, this threshold moves down to age co-
horts born around 1975. Surprisingly, all generations covered in our projections have a
lower implicit tax rate in the 1995 scenario than in the 1992 variant, provided that they
go on working until the statutory retirement age. This reflects the fact that the 1992 re-
form was mainly about cutting the overall volume of future pension expenditure, while
the 1995 package moved on to addressing “structural” reforms in some more detail.26
Among other things, disincentives regarding prolonged activity were targeted at more
precisely by the measures applied in 1995. In other words, a majority of individuals who
would have retired early under the 1992 rules effectively have to pay part of the bill.
Apart from these details, the overall picture obtained in figure 7 is similar to our
earlier results. In the pre-1992 case, implicit tax rates are extremely low for those born
1940 through 1945, while  t τ  is continuously rising for subsequent generations. Against
this background, the major effect of pension reform is that higher burdens are placed on
old and middle-aged workers, while the increase for young and future age cohorts is
reduced or, in the case of the 1995 reform, even reverted. The latter aspect highlights
that, given the substantial pressure in terms of projected future pension expenditure, the
reforms adopted in Italy during the 1990s are really remarkable.
4.5 Sweden
By European standards, Sweden offers another example of fundamental pension reform,
in spite of the fact that the country is not as severely affected by demographic ageing as
many other OECD countries are. Prior to changes enacted in 1998, the Swedish public
pension scheme was operated as a two-tier system, comprising both a universal flat-rate
pension (Folkpension) dating back to 1947 and an important earnings-related, or “sup-
plementary”, pension (Allmän tilläggspension, ATP) which was introduced in 1960.
38
Folkpensions were granted to everyone who had lived in Sweden for more than three
years or had at least had three years of employment in the country. In order to qualify
for a fully-fledged basic pension, however, 40 years of residence or employment were
needed, and the pension was reduced proportionally for each year effectively lacking.
Originally, basic pensions were completely financed from general government reve-
nues. Since 1974, they were partly covered by contributions imposed on employers and
the self-employed only. In 1998, the level of basic pensions (payable per retiree in the
household) was approximately 14.5 per cent of current average wages.
Over time, the ATP system turned out to be the dominant form of public pensions,
backed by participation rates of both males and females that are relatively high if com-
pared on an international level. The amount of ATP benefits was contingent on years
worked and wages earned. For individuals who worked for 30 years or more, ATP pen-
sions amounted to around 60 per cent of their average pensionable earnings, calculated
from the “best” 15 years in employment. As the combined effect of basic pensions and
ATP claims, pensions for a married single-earner with a full life-time working-career
were at a level of about 72 per cent of current average earnings. Until 1994, ATP pen-
                                           
38  For many years, the Swedish system of public pensions has been augmented by employer-based pen-
sions which were not affected by the recent reforms.27
sions were exclusively financed by contributions raised from employers and self-
employed. In 1995, employees’ contributions were introduced at a rate of 1 per cent,
total contributions then being 19.86 per cent of gross wages.
39 Since 1998, contribution
rates are next to equally shared between employers and employees.
It should be mentioned that, over the years, the ATP system has built up a consid-
erable amount of buffer funds which are now equal to total pension expenditure of about
three and a half years. During the 1990s, however, net injections into these funds have
become negative. Given constant contribution rates, the funds would have expired in
2012, contribution rates then jumping up to around 23 per cent and further increasing to
around 30 per cent until the late 2030s. Following several years of fiddling around with
some parameters of the old system, these unfavourable prospects triggered a reform
enacted in 1998 which established an entirely new set of rules (Palmer 2000; 2002).
The new Swedish pension system again has two branches, one (the “income”, or
“income-related”, pension) being a comprehensive pay-as-you-go scheme, the other (the
“premium” pension) being based on mandatory savings. Starting from 2001, social se-
curity contributions are set to18.5 per cent of gross wages, subject to an upper limit, of
which 16 percentage points are used for financing current pensions, while 2.5 percent-
age points are channelled into pension funds with individual accounts. Individuals who
have extremely low income or no income at all are protected by a guarantee pension
which is financed from the general budget and, net of taxes, is in the range of earlier
Folkpension claims.
Like the Italian post-1995 public pension scheme, the new pay-as-you-go scheme
is operated based on “notional individual accounts”. I.e., pension benefits are strictly
related to earlier contributions, using both an imputed real rate of return of 1.6 per cent
(adjusted if actual growth rates exceed this limit) and all the information that is avail-
able regarding future (“unisex”) life-expectancies of new cohorts of pensioners.
40 In
other words, the system is close to a conventional “defined contribution” plan based on
actual individual accounts, and principles of actuarial fairness are introduced into the
domain of public pensions. The new system is expected to go along with constant con-
tribution rates. The cost is that, over the long term, the replacement rate of pay-as-you-
                                           
39  The portion of contributions that is attributable to old-age pensions was 16.0 per cent. As in the case of
France, we have to omit disability pensions here, because they were financed from various sources
during the simulation period. In periods where they were financed from social security contributions,
we adjust contribution rates based on the share of pension expenditure related to disability.
40  It should be mentioned that, apart from Folkpensions or guarantee pensions for spouses without any
work-record of their own, survivor pensions have been largely absent from the Swedish pension sys-
tem even in the past. In the new system, additional cover can be bought for survivors, or a single-
earner’s pension can be annuitised taking into account benefits accruing to survivant spouses.28
go pensions will decrease by 50 per cent or more if measured by earnings of those who
are currently active.
As was mentioned before, income pensions provided by the new pay-as-you-go
scheme are augmented by so-called premium pensions which arise from mandatory
savings which have to be made at a rate of 2.5 per cent of annual gross earnings. This
fraction is collected along with all other social security contributions at next to no ad-
ministrative costs, making sure that everyone complies with the compulsory rules.
Funds can be invested in a very broad array of certified assets, including shares, bonds
and other securities that are available through financial markets. Also, savers can flexi-
bly adjust their portfolio, bearing the full financial risk of all their transactions. In order
to keep transaction costs low, all investment is channelled through a public “premium
pension authority” (Premiepensionsmyndigheten, PPM). This body acts as a meta-fund
manager and as a clearing-house, carrying out all net-transactions that arise from indi-
vidual (re-)investment decisions.
41 All in all, the framework invented for premium pen-
sions appears to be a flexible, low-cost combination of public administration and pri-
vate-sector arrangements which deserves a lot of attention from other countries that are
trying to move their overall system of old-age provision in the direction of higher pre-
funding through investment in financial markets. Since, by definition, contributions
made to the premium pension system earn a market rate of interest (disregarding risk
and transaction cost, if any), they do not involve an implicit tax. Therefore, this branch
of the new Swedish pension system will be ignored in our simulations.
Again, transition from the old to the new system is only gradual, with cohorts born
between 1938 and 1953 being subject to a mixed regime. However, the speed of transi-
tion is high.
42 As a consequence, the shift in net life-time taxes from young age cohorts
to those who are already approaching retirement turns out to be a huge one (see figure
8). Cohorts born up until the mid-1970s effectively face higher implicit tax rates in the
new regime than they would have in the old one. At the same time, the Swedish have
apparently halted further increases in implicit tax rates for younger individuals before
they would have climbed up to levels projected for many other European countries.
In the old system implicit tax rates would have continuously increased from less
than 3 per cent of life-time earnings of those born in 1940 to more than 20 per cent for
those born today. Following the 1998 reform, tax burdens almost perfectly level off at
about 12 per cent for individuals born 1954 and later, i.e. for those who are fully subject
                                           
41  The PPM also provides a low-risk unit portfolio, the “Premium saving fund”, for those who do not
report any particular choices of funds.
42  Pensioners born 1938 will receive 80 per cent of their pension benefits calculated according the rules
of the old system, 20 per cent based on the new rules. For each subsequent cohort, this mixture will be
shifted by ± 5 per cent, respectively.29
to the new pension system. Essentially, this is a result of two effects. On the one hand,
future pay-as-you-go pensions accruing to life-time contributors have been adjusted to a
level which, after the transition period, is next to constant in terms of life-time present
values. On the other hand, given current demographic projections, the level of benefits
also allows for constant contribution rates.
Figure 8: Implicit tax rates − the case of Sweden
Source: CESifo Pension Model.
4.6 United States
If compared to European countries, demographic ageing is by far less significant in the
US. Nonetheless, discussions about the consequences of ageing for US Social Security
started at an early stage in the 1980s and, with some variation in intensity, have been
going on ever since. The Social Security scheme has been established in 1935, com-
prising all branches of old-age, disability and survivors insurance and, at that time, cov-
ering most employed individuals. Over time, coverage became almost universal, now
including also the self-employed and most public-sector employees. Old-age pensions
are based on a career average of (wage-)indexed earnings, based on the “best” 35 years
in employment. The formula used for calculating benefits is progressive, since individ-
ual amounts of average indexed earnings are divided into several brackets which are
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43 This implies that a higher replacement rate applies to retirees who
had lower life-time earnings, such that US Social Security is situated half way between
an almost entirely “linear” system like the German one and a system providing flat-rate
benefits like the U.K. State Basic Pension scheme. After award, benefits are regularly
adjusted to cost-of-living inflation.
Currently, the statutory retirement age is 65 for individuals born 1937 or earlier,
while early retirement benefits are available starting from age 62 with next-to-
actuarially-fair reductions. A reform enacted as early as 1983 gradually raises the nor-
mal retirement age to 67 for individuals born after 1960, early retirement still being pos-
sible starting from age 62 with a permanent reduction of benefits by up to 30 per cent.
Since 1990, all components of social security benefits, i.e. old-age pensions, disability
benefits and survivors’ benefits, are financed from contributions raised on gross earn-
ings at a rate of 12.4 per cent, the tax base as well as covered earnings being subject to
an upper limit of about 2.5 times average earnings.
An important feature of the US Social Security system is that it is currently build-
ing up a buffer fund intended as a pre-requisite to cope with demographic ageing. In the
course of the 1983 reform, the decision was taken to increase contribution rates beyond
current cost rates, such that annual revenues now regularly exceed annual pension ex-
penditure. The idea was to expand the Social Security Trust Funds which existed before
on a much smaller scale, thus collecting reserves in order to finance for old-age provi-
sion in future periods when the “baby boomers” would enter retirement.
44 This is a gen-
eral strategy of dealing with the financial pressure arising from projected ageing – at the
same time reshuffling burdens across generations – which has been considered in sev-
eral other countries.
45 However, the US are one of the few examples where this option
has been chosen in good time and has now been followed for almost two decades. The
drawback is that the funds, which are publicly managed and not attributable to insured
individuals, are mainly invested in government bonds. As mentioned earlier, the conse-
quence is that fund depreciation will affect the general government budget.
In the public as well as among economists, the reform taken in 1983 has not re-
moved concerns about the future of Social Security. During recent years, discussions
have focused on issues like the feasibility of a transition to a fully-fledged capital-
                                           
43  On top of a retired worker’s pension claim, another 50 per cent of the benefit are granted to his or her
spouse, unless the additional amount is not exceeded by the spouse’s own pension claim.
44  Not only the extent, but also the timing of demographic ageing in the US is different from that envis-
aged for most European countries. In this country, the “baby boom” started immediately after World
War II, such that “baby boomers” will enter retirement age starting before 2010.
45  In the case of Germany, a similar proposal has been made by the Advisory Board of the Federal Min-
istry of Economics (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 1998).31
reserve system based on individual accounts or, which amounts to virtually the same, on
privatising the current system of public old-age provision (Feldstein 1995; Kotlikoff et
al. 1998). In any of these cases, first-pillar pensions and the most important forms of
employer-based, second-pillar pensions would tend to converge.
46 The debate on social
security reform gained momentum following the change from the Clinton administra-
tion to the presidency of George Bush Jr.
47 In May 2001, the latter established a new
“President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security” which, in their interim and
(draft) final reports (President’s Commission 2001a; 2001b), showed much concern
about expected depreciation of the Social Security Trust Funds. The alternatives sug-
gested by the commission, all involving a (partial) transition to an individual account
system, are not undisputed. Currently, there are no final conclusions regarding the fu-
ture design of US Social Security.
Financial prospects for maintaining Social Security based on the current legal
framework are explored on a regular basis by official forecasts which, covering a time
horizon of 75 years into the future, are extremely long-term in their nature (see, for in-
stance, Board of Trustees 2000). For our calculations, we decided to build on these
projections, adapting them to our set of assumptions where needed for cross-country
comparability. In addition, we had to check for the robustness of results regarding the
points in time when net investment in the Social Security Trust Funds would turn nega-
tive, when it would finally be exhausted, etc. Also, we effectively consider two scenar-
ios. Building on the current legal framework, we constructed a “Social Security Trust
Funds” scenario, encompassing all changes enacted in 1983 (plus some further correc-
tions which have been added subsequently). As a counter-factual, we also look at a pure
“pay-as-you-go” scenario, using the time series of full “cost rates” applying to annual
Social Security expenditure instead of actual contribution rates throughout the projec-
tion period. Figure 9 illustrates our results obtained for the case of US Social Security.
The low level of implicit tax rates estimated for the case of the US is a conse-
quence of the fact that public involvement in the overall system of old-age provision is
relatively low in this country. In addition, part of the “inaugural gains” arising from the
introduction or expansion of unfunded pension schemes may be reflected in very low
                                           
46  In the US, occupational pensions are very important. Within this pillar, there has been a notable move
from “defined benefit” (DB) plans to “defined contributions” (DC) plans over the last two decades. A
wide-spread sub-category of pensions of the latter type is represented by so-called “401(k) plans” –
named after the relevant section of the Internal Revenue Code.
47  President Clinton, when announcing the prospects for a longer period of budgetary surpluses in Con-
gress, had suggested to “Save Social Security First”. In contrast, President Bush Jr. decided to “spend”
these surpluses on major tax reductions and, more recently, on higher government expenditure meant
to stimulate the economic development in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on
New York City and Washington D.C.32
implicit tax rates falling on the first age cohorts covered by our calculations. For indi-
viduals born between 1955 and 1980, the extensive use made of the Social Security
Trust Funds – as a buffer fund against the impact of demographic ageing on social secu-
rity contributions – implies that implicit tax burdens are next to constant at a level of
about 3.5 per cent. Those born 1980 or later are affected by ageing at an increasing rate,
implicit taxes approaching 5.5 per cent of life-time earnings for individuals born today.
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Source: CESifo Pension Model.
A result implied in current official projections run by the Social Security Board of
Trustees (2000) is that, for the entire old-age, survivors and disability insurance scheme,
cost rates will exceed contributions rates starting from 2014. According to our calcula-
tions, the reserves collected in the Social Security Trust Funds will effectively start de-
creasing in 2022/23, due to continuing accumulation of returns on existing funds. Social
Security will finally run out of funds around 2043. Instead of paying contribution rates
that are constant at their current level (12.4 per cent), young and future generations will
then be faced with the full amount of higher cost rates, climbing up from about 17.8 per
cent to close to 20 per cent during the following three to four decades.
Nonetheless, a comparison with the pure pay-as-you-go scenario reveals that the
“trust fund” strategy chosen in 1983 removes much of the inter-generational redistribu-
tion which would have been involved in population ageing in the absence of any pre-33
cautionary reforms. Increasing social security taxes beyond current cost rates in the pe-
riod from 1983 to 2013 (and raising the statutory age of retirement) has increased im-
plicit tax rates for the age cohorts born until 1970. At the same time, taking these meas-
ures at an early stage has helped in averting a situation where implicit taxes would have
gone up to about 8.5 per cent for individuals born in the year of 2000.
4.7 Japan
From a European perspective, the Japanese system of old-age provision shares some
common features with the U.K. system.
48 The overall system of old-age protection in
Japan has many branches, with employer-based schemes playing an important role.
Within the public pension system, two schemes provide the standard form of public
pensions awarded to the typical employee, one being a flat-rate scheme with rather low
benefits which is open to all the long-term residents, the other usually granting a larger
fraction of retirement income in the form of earnings-related benefits. In the following,
we will concentrate on these two schemes, providing a “universal pension benefit” (ko-
kumin nenkin) and a compulsory supplementary pension for private sector employees
(kôsei nenkin hoken).
The universal, or National, pension system has been set up in 1959 for people who
did not receive cover from any company pension plan. It has become universal in 1986.
Basically, the contribution is a monthly flat-rate of 13,300 ¥ (since 1998). For wage
earners, this contribution is included in those made to the earnings-related system. For
their spouses, contributions to the universal systems are free. A fully-fledged pension
claim is acquired after 40 years of membership and is then given by a monthly benefit
of 66,625 ¥. Universal pensions are financed on a pure pay-as-you-go basis, part of the
revenues being taken from general taxation.
The current system of supplementary, earnings-related pensions has been installed
in 1954, replacing older arrangements of a similar type. In contrast to public pension
schemes in most other industrialised countries, the system is based on pay-as-you-go
financing with a substantial stock of capital reserves. If compared to the cases of Swe-
den and the US, capital reserves in the Japanese system are supposed to be more than
just a “buffer fund”, intended to depreciate entirely as the “baby boomers” retire. But
again, funds are mainly invested in government bonds, thus allowing for much more
flexibility in determining current benefits and contribution rates than with a binding
pay-as-you-go constraint, while for the public budget as a whole the system is not too
                                           
48  For relevant surveys, see Clark (1998), Estienne and Murakami (2000), or Conrad (2001).34
different from explicit non-funding with respect to the problems involved in demo-
graphic ageing.
In the early years covered by our simulations, contributions to the public pension
system have been rather low. In 1960, contribution rates were no higher than 3.335 per
cent of monthly earnings, subject to an upper limit and excluding annual bonuses which
generally amount to between three and four months’ earnings. Contribution rates ex-
ceeded 10 per cent of monthly earnings in the early 1980s and have climbed up to the
current rate of 17.35 per cent in 1997. Since 1994, annual bonuses are included in fi-
nancing the pension system through a special deduction of 1 per cent.
The replacement rate for a wage earner with a full life-time working career, jointly
determined for his universal pension claim and the earnings-related component of pub-
lic pensions, is now in the range of 50 per cent of gross earnings excluding bonus pay-
ments. In terms of net pension levels, this amounts to roughly 65 per cent of net earn-
ings, now including average bonuses. In addition, a married couple will receive a sec-
ond flat-rate benefit for a spouse who has not participated in the labour force. As in the
cases of France and the US, individual pensions at award are adjusted to meet the
aforementioned replacement levels. Following the latest reform enacted in 2000, they
are then indexed to consumer prices in order to keep up their purchasing power.
One of the most important problems of the Japanese pension system is that the
country is among those most heavily affected by demographic ageing. Total fertility
rates in Japan have gone down from more than 3.5 births per woman in her fertile age in
the early 1950s to a current 1.3. In most other OECD countries, the peak of the “baby
boom” has been at lower fertility rates which rarely exceeded 2.5, while the current
birth rate in Japan falls in the same range as in some European “low fertility” countries.
At the same time, life expectancy of elderly Japanese people ranges considerably ahead
of that in other industrialised countries, the median length of life being 80.2 years for
male persons and 86.8 years for females.
Recent discussions regarding pension reform started some years ago.
49 In 1997, the
government officially constituted a consultative committee. A “White paper on pen-
sions” was drafted for the first time, which has been up-dated several times during the
discussions. In its original form, the paper laid out different policy scenarios ranging
from an unchanged level of benefits over several options of reducing benefits by 10 to
40 per cent to a radical abolition of supplementary pensions provided by the state. Offi-
cially, none of these proposals was favoured over the others by the public authorities
involved. In a subsequent version of the White paper (Ministry for Health and Welfare
                                           
49  See Estienne and Murakami (2000) who explain the anatomy of the reform process, discuss the pro-
posals that have been made so far and add an annex on earlier reforms.35
2000), only three scenarios were left: For the “status-quo” variant with constant benefit
levels, contribution rates were projected to climb up to 34.5 per cent of monthly earn-
ings (excluding bonuses) by the year of 2025; then, they were assumed to stay constant
until 2060. In the two alternative scenarios, the level of benefits was reduced by about
15 per cent until the year of 2025. Depending on the fraction of universal flat-rate bene-
fits which were to be financed from the general government budget – one third or one
half – contribution rates were expected to go up to 27.6 or 25.2 per cent.
50
The year 2000 reform mainly followed the paths suggested in the revised White
paper (Conrad 2001; Clark and Mitchell 2001). The benefit level was immediately cur-
tailed by about 5 per cent, reducing the coefficients applied to converting indexed refer-
ence earnings into pension benefits from 0.75 to 0.7125 per year of contributions. The
mechanism for indexing benefits after award was switched from wage indexation to
(French or US style) CPI indexation − so far, however, authorities appear to be reluctant
to actually practise this new rule. With respect to the branch for universal pension bene-
fits, the share of general tax revenues was expanded to cover approximately one third of
annual pension expenditure.
Regarding implicit tax rates involved in the Japanese public pension system, we
will therefore effectively compare the “1999 legal framework” (with a constant level of
benefits) to a “current policy” scenario related to the year 2000 reform (where benefits
are decreased by –15 per cent and nominal contributions will reach the 27.6 per cent
level).
51 The results displayed in figure 10 first of all indicate that the Japanese public
pension scheme is still on its way to maturing in the sense that (i) the system has nota-
bly expanded in terms of replacement rates and contribution rates until the 1980s and
that (ii) the current shift away from a system which was nominally funded and could
draw on substantial capital reserves to a system which is largely, and openly, unfunded
is still well on its way. Those who were born in the 1940s and entered the system in the
1960s had to pay for a very low fraction of current pensions. Upon retirement, they will
receive pensions at a considerable level. As a consequence, they end up with implicit
tax rates that are strongly negative. Over all subsequent generations, implicit taxes go
                                           
50  In a sense, the revised reform proposals compromise between reform scenarios “B” and “C” of the
first draft of the White paper mentioned in Estienne and Murakami (2000): There, the reduction in
benefit levels would have been 10 or 20 per cent. Absent any changes in state subsidies, the corre-
sponding contribution rates would have been 30 or 26 per cent in the long run, respectively.
51  Here, as in the case of US Social Security, we mostly rely on official projections published in the
White paper on pensions. With some care, we have been checking whether the developments of bene-
fit levels, contribution rates and pension funds projected there would appear to be feasible or whether,
according to our calculations, the system could entirely run out of funds within the projection horizon.
The latter turned out to be wrong.36
up by a substantial portion of life-time earnings. For age cohorts who are currently
young, they will eventually reach “European style” levels.
Figure 10: Implicit tax rates − the case of Japan
Source: CESifo Pension Model.
This general tendency is true for the 1999 scenario as well as for the 2000 reform
variant. In the latter case, however, the reduction in benefit levels and a much more
modest increase in contribution rates visibly affect the inter-generational distribution of
implicit tax burdens. The reform turns out to be beneficial for age cohorts born around
1980 and afterwards, at the expense of higher implicit tax rates for older generations.
More precisely, the reform increases implicit tax rates falling on those born in 1940
from –9.4 per cent in the 1999 variant to –7.1 per cent in the reform scenario, while de-
creasing the end-of-projection level from close to 13 per cent to about 10.7 per cent.
In Japan as well as in many other cases, the situation of public pensions appears to
be more balanced after the reforms analysed here than before – provided that smoothing
life-time tax profiles across generations is a meaningful task in itself. At the same time,
the calculations we have made are lacking any interior measure for what type of re-
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Pre-2000 law: constant level of benefits
Current policy scenario: level of benefits -15%37
5 The role of institutional characteristics
We have now studied in some detail how typical policy responses affect individu-
als who belong to different age cohorts during the process of demographic transition.
We looked at minor adjustments in benefit levels (in the cases of Germany and Japan);
switches between wage indexation and CPI indexation, plus other measures intended to
tighten existing public pension schemes (France and the U.K.); partial pre-funding (the
US); and fundamental pension reforms (Italy and Sweden). As the last step to take, we
will now try to understand the role of basic institutional features of public pension
schemes for the trends in implicit tax rates observed in different countries.
In order to do so, we will first of all plot the changes projected for implicit tax rates
(falling on those born between 1950 and 2000) against changes in old-age dependency
ratios (for the period from 2000 to 2050) for all our “current policy scenarios” and some
of the major variants of our simulations (see figure 11). By its construction, this is not a
strong empirical test.
52 But it can illustrate, at least in a basic fashion, to what extent
observed increases in  t τ  are due to demographic change and to what extent they may be
attributed to other, mainly institutional characteristics of national pension systems.
Apart from individual results, figure 11 also displays a linear trend line indicating
that, for the average of the countries and scenarios considered, an increase in old-age
dependency by 1 percentage point leads to an increase in  t τ  by about 0.4 percentage
points. Taken in itself, this number is hard to interpret. Considering national pension
policies explained in the previous section, we may however conclude that this is a less
than “natural” increase since all the countries we looked at are actively engaging in
policies meant to control the future burden of pension financing. In any case, we may
take the trend line as representing the average proportion between population ageing
and financial burdens involved in public pensions (given average efforts to combat fis-
cal pressures, that is). Abstracting from many other potential determinants, deviations
from the trend line (upward or downward) can then be seen as a rough indicator for how
successful diverging institutional arrangements are in terms of coping with a given trend
in the population structure. In order to exploit this idea more fully, we plug in several
aspects of institutional design that may affect the observed heterogeneity in figure 12.
                                           
52  We look at absolute changes (measured in percentage points) rather than relative changes because,
given the cross-country differences in (initial) levels of τ, the latter turned out to be less telling. We
omit results for cohorts born 1940 through 1949 in order to abstract from effects that are mainly due to
the phase-in of public pension schemes. We confront estimates for implicit taxes falling on those born
1950 and 2000 with population structures related to 2000 and 2050, respectively, following the simple
idea that, in each case, the cohort considered is in the midst of their “pension career”, half way be-
tween taking up work at some point in their 20s and passing away in their 70s.38
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Sources: Implicit taxes: CESifo Pension Model; Population: U.S. Bureau of Census–online,
Eurostat (2000), Statistical Office of Japan (2001).
Taking into account the complexity of pension arrangements and the determinants
of their financial viability, we cannot expect to obtain a very clear-cut picture from our
exercise. Nonetheless, going through panels a) to d) in figure 12, we feel in a position to
sum up the following observations.
53
−  Financing method: High increases in implicit tax rates (exceeding the trend line)
are most likely to occur in pay-as-you-go systems with revenues coming from both
ear-marked contributions and general taxation. In cases where benefits are financed
from one of these sources alone, limits to the pension budget appear to be more
binding. Also, systems with partial pre-funding are likely to fare better than the
trend line would predict.
54, 55
                                           
53  Of course, our sample is small and, for many reasons, may be subject to a selection bias. However, the
conclusions reached are qualitatively the same as in Werding and Blau (2002) where 17 OECD coun-
tries are looked at using the change in pension expenditure per GDP (taken from OECD 2001a) as a
measure of the fiscal consequences of ageing.
54  This may not be surprising because, in theory, pre-funding draws on interest income to reduce the
implicit wage tax involved in pay-as-you-go schemes. In practice, however, publicly managed funds
can be invested in low yield bonds, and funds can be diverted from old-age provision for many other
reasons. In our calculations, we do not account for this type of “political” risk.
55  The outlier is the old Swedish system which has collected a substantial amount of buffer funds over-
time without a clear perspective of how to use these funds in order to manage future challenges.39
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(c) Indexation mechanisms (d) Median age at withdrawal (males)
Sources: CESifo Pension Model; U.S. Bureau of Census, Eurostat (2000), Statistical Office of Japan
(2001); OECD (2001b); DICE (CESifo Database for Institutional Comparisons in Europe).
−  Type of benefits: The type of benefits paid − earnings-related, with or without a
flat-rate component, or mainly flat-rate − does not seem to have much significance
for the way demographic ageing affects the pension budget. Systems with mainly
earnings-related benefits are among those hit the most and the least with respect to40
projected increases in implicit taxes. The U.K. system where flat-rate benefits
dominate may be in a relatively favourable position mainly because the system is
not very generous in general (and because demographic pressure is rather low).
−  Indexation mechanism: Regarding the mechanisms applied to indexing benefits,
the result appears to be clear. Wherever a clear-cut rule is followed, increases in
implicit taxes are lower and more likely to be below the trend line. Not surpris-
ingly, CPI indexation appears to produce the smallest changes. Pure wage indexa-
tion is more, but not excessively “expensive”. Mixed regimes, where indexation
are largely ad hoc (and can be heavily influenced by politically powerful lobbies)
implies the highest upward deviations from the trend line.
56
−  Age at withdrawal: It seems plausible to assume that fighting early retirement
plays an important role in the reduction of future burdens involved in public pen-
sions, at least in (continental) Europe. In all countries, except France, adjustments
are under way that are meant to increase the effective age at withdrawal, postpon-
ing pension take-up and barring other ways out of the labour force. Whether these
policies will be successful is largely open.
57 Still, what we can observe based on
our projections is that countries in which the need for pension reform is, or has
been, most urgent (with  t τ  going up a lot in at least one of the scenarios consid-
ered) are mainly those with very low ages at retirement today.
58
Finally, we should add that one potentially very important aspect is absent from
our cross-country comparisons: the level of benefits or, speaking more generally, the
generosity of national pension systems. The most important reason for this omission is
that meaningful assessments with respect to this point are largely lacking. Accounting
for the average level of benefits in each country is clearly not enough because it ignores
the many dimensions of redistribution that can be entailed in actual pension systems: by
earnings brackets, non-employment spells, household structure both during activity and
retirement age, etc.
Perhaps, the most reliable source that is currently available comparing retirees’ in-
come on an international level is OECD (2001b). The study reports on six of the coun-
tries included here − viz., all except France − representing the situation for current (but
not future) pensioners. The remarkable result is that “total (quasi-)replacement rates”,
                                           
56  Here, Sweden is not really a counter-example. In the new Swedish system, indexation is based on an
explicit rule (GDP growth). Note that, with ageing and declining populations, GDP growth can be sub-
stantially lower than productivity and wage growth.
57  From a normative point of view, this may not matter too much provided that third-party payments are
abolished which presently distort individual retirement decisions in many existing pension schemes.
58  Information regarding median ages at withdrawal is taken from Scherer (2002), an auxiliary paper to
the OECD (2001b) study.41
relating all types of retirement income per-capita to current income of average workers,
are very homogenous across countries, falling in the 80 to 90 per cent range in each
case. Yet, shares of public benefits in typical retirees’ budgets differ considerably, Swe-
den and Germany (70 to 80 per cent) ranking clearly ahead of Italy (around 65 per cent)
and way ahead of the U.K., the US, and Japan (30 to 40 per cent). Inasmuch as these
differences are not affected by pension reforms that have already been taken, but just
need some time to become fully effective, they clearly contribute to explaining the dif-
ferent levels and trends in implicit tax rates illustrated in figures 11 and 12.
6 Conclusions
The overall picture obtained in this paper is that, on average, demographic ageing must
be expected to drive up the burden involved in public pension schemes for young and
future age cohorts. Also, our projections tell us a lot about what can be done to deal
with these imminent trends, while they are next to silent on what should be done. We
have seen that the major effect of pension reform is given by a reduction in burdens
imposed on younger generations, at the expense of older generations who have to pay
higher life-time taxes. In other words, the primary impact of reform appears to be a re-
versal of the current inter-generational redistribution from future to living generations.
In order to establish clear-cut policy recommendations in this area, one would therefore
need criteria by which the inter-generational pattern of implicit tax rates involved in
unfunded pensions can be assessed more rigorously. Neither a pure welfarist approach
nor public choice considerations would easily lend support to the conclusion that em-
barking on this prevailing type of pension reform is useful.
In the relevant literature, it has taken an extended discussion to establish that the
pay-as-you-go mechanism as such is inter-generationally efficient (Breyer 1989; Fenge
1995; for a brief survey, see Sinn 2000). Unless there are additional distortions created
by the way contributions are levied or benefits are defined, converting unfunded pen-
sions into fully-funded schemes will never lead to a Pareto-improvement. (At the same
time, all improvements that are feasible could also be had when just removing distor-
tions, without any change in the basic financing mechanism.) Up to a point, these theo-
retical results are confirmed by our calculations for the case of real-word pension
schemes. Given that unfunded pension schemes are basically efficient, why should pre-
sent governments care about increasing life-time tax rates for younger age cohorts?
First of all, individuals belonging to different age groups may themselves be inter-
ested in a more balanced distribution of life-time burdens. More specifically, older gen-42
erations may care for the well-being of their children and grand children based on some
sort of (intra-family, inter-generational, “forward looking”) altruism, feeling uneasy
about the burden unfunded pensions place on income and consumption of their off-
spring. As an alternative, governments could have an independent view on inter-gener-
ational redistribution, maximising an aggregate welfare function in which some weight
is attributed to the well-being of young (and future) age cohorts. In the case of altruism,
increasing life-time taxes would turn out be a problem in terms of efficiency in a sense
which is not captured in standard reflections on this issue. In the alternative case, con-
siderations regarding efficiency and distributional issues are no longer a distinct matter
because some notion of inter-generational fairness is incorporated in the relevant wel-
fare function.
Net life-time taxes that are constantly increasing over time imply that the “excess
burden” of this kind of taxation – as perceived by altruistic individuals or by an inter-
generationally benevolent government – will grow more than proportional to the in-
crease in tax rates. Given that, a particular type of welfare loss may be caused by distor-
tions of the consumption pattern across generations. The costs of this inefficiency can
be minimised by smoothing the profile of implicit tax rates (see Barro 1974; 1979). Of
course, this policy recommendation is valid only if there is some kind of inter-gener-
ational link that can be used to compare welfare losses falling on different generations.
Two further aspects are important in this context. First, while the two justifications
for tax smoothing mentioned here converge with regard to optimal policy recommenda-
tions, they turn out to be very different in terms of public choice considerations. If older
people behave altruistically towards younger generations they may be willing to accept
reductions in their pension claims and increases in the life-time taxes they are facing. As
long as the median voter has children, majority votes will induce politicians to share this
view. Absent altruism, however, an inter-generationally benevolent government pursu-
ing paternalistic policies that are in line with its welfare function will find it difficult to
convince self-interested individuals to vote for a tax-smoothing pension reform.
Second, for the case without altruism, one should spell out in some more detail the
precise nature of equity norms a given society would have to accept in order to arrive at
the conclusion that the intergenerational distribution of burdens needs to be corrected.
For instance, under the premise that “equitable” taxation is taken to say that each gen-
eration should be burdened according to an “equal relative sacrifice” rule, the increase
of implicit tax rates for younger generations would be regarded a problem in terms of
justice. Nevertheless, other criteria for intergenerational redistribution can be conceived43
of,
59 and the criteria by which actual pension reforms will be guided are largely open. In
fact, they will be strongly influenced by the political process. In many cases, the true
nature of the equity considerations behind any decisions taken will remain unclear.
Apart from considerations in terms of equity and efficiency, one of the most
prominent (and at the same time most pressing) problems of pay-as-you-go pension
schemes is their political instability. As we have seen, large-scale demographic ageing
implies an increasing burden on future generations. As a consequence, it is uncertain
whether future generations will go on to co-operate and finance for current benefits, or
whether they will resist the entire system. As Hayek (1960, p. 297) put it:
“With the age distribution we are approaching, there is no reason why the majority
over forty should not soon attempt to make those of a lower age toil for them. It
may be only at that point that the physically stronger will rebel and deprive the old
of both their political rights and their legal claims to be maintained.”
From an economist’s perspective, it is difficult to say what consequences, both political
and legal, younger generations will draw from their perception of the burden involved in
ageing, and even declining, population. Their options range from voting for pension
reform to working less, evading into the shadow economy, or emigrating into countries
with lower implicit tax rates. Smoothing the time profile of implicit taxes may be part of
a defensive policy by which potential conflicts are reduced in good time in order to im-
prove, if nothing else, on the long-run sustainability of existing public pension schemes.
                                           
59 For instance, higher life-time taxes can be regarded a progressive tax on increasing wealth that
younger age cohorts receive, rather than produce, just in the course of real economic growth (Burtless
2001). Or, one could argue that welfare judgements based on the burden involved in old-age pensions
alone are incomplete: what really matters might be the full set of inter-generational transactions, in-
cluding expenditure on children and their education (Sinn and Werding 2000; Werding 2002).44
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Appendix A:
Sources of data and information regarding national pension schemes
A.1 Population projections
Population projections for EU countries are taken from Eurostat (2000). For the US and
Japan, we use official forecasts provided by the U.S. Bureau of Census−online and the
Statistical Office of Japan (2001), respectively, in sections 2.1 and 5 for illustrative pur-
poses; we rely on population projections entailed in Board of Trustees (2000) and Min-
istry of Health and Welfare (2000) for our simulations in section 4.
A.2 Economic variables
Historical data regarding labour force participation, employment, wage growth, and
interest rates are taken from the OECD database regularly published in the “Economic
Outlook”. In some cases, we used data provided by national pension administrations
instead (see A.3). Regarding future developments of participation rates and unemploy-
ment rates, we basically relied on assumptions agreed upon for the parallel projects run
by the OECD (2001a) and the Economic Policy Committee of the EU (2001). Regard-
ing future real wage growth and real interest rates, we used the assumptions reported in
section 2.3 (1.75 per cent and 4 per cent p.a., respectively).
A.3 Pension schemes
Specific information regarding national pension schemes has been collected from the
following sources:
60
−  Germany: Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger (http:\\www.vdr.de).
−  France: Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Vieillesse (http://www.retraite.cnav.fr and
http://www.legislation.cnav.fr).
−  UK: Department of Employment and Pensions (http://www.pensionguide.gov.uk
and http://www.dss.gov.uk).
−  Italy: Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (http://www.inps.it).
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60  In addition, those particularly interested in institutional comparisons are referred to the survey on more
than 150 “Social Security Programs Throughout the World” provided by the U.S. Social Security Ad-
ministration (http://www.ssa.gov). For a smaller set of countries, similar information is available from
the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (http://www.mhw.go.jp/english/wp\_5/) or, for a
European context, from the web site of the German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
(http://www.bma.de). Another source of growing importance is the CESifo Database on Institutional
Comparisons in Europe (http:\\www.cesifo.de).49
−  Sweden:  Försäkringskassan and Försäkringskasseförbundet (http://www.fk.se,
http://www.fkf.se, and http://www.pension.nu).
−  USA: Social Security Administration (http://www.ssa.gov).
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−  Japan: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (http://www.mhlw.go.jp).
Appendix B: Stylised biography
Table B.1: The standardised agent considered in the model:
basic assumptions for the case of Germany
Age 20–52 Full-time labour force participation with average earnings









Age 53–64 Reduced probability of full-time participation
→ Reduced contributions based on 83.4 %* of full-time earnings









Age 65–74* Period of retirement










Age 75(–86*) Individual dies at age 75*










                                                                                                                               
61  For a thorough description of the new benefit formula introduced in 1995 and for all the transitional
arrangements involved in the 1992 and 1995 reforms, see the appendix to Ministero del Teso-
ro / Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (1998).
62  Regarding past developments, we also used the host of relevant data published in Social Security Ad-
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